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1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I consider some issues concerning cognitive enhancements and 
the ethics of enhancing in reproduction and parenting. I argue that there are 
moral reasons to enhance the cognitive capacities of the children one has, or of 
the children one is going to have, and that these enhancements should not be 
seen as an alternative to pursuing important changes in society that might also 
improve one’s own and one’s children’s life. It has been argued that an empha-
sis on enhancing cognitive capacities might encourage the commodification of 
children. But this objection seems misplaced. The reasons why one decides to 
reproduce can be subject to moral approbation or condemnation, as such rea-
sons might be indicators of the quality of one’s parenting and the happiness of 
the future persons one is committed to bringing to life. However, once the de-
cision to reproduce is made, no further harm comes from taking as few risks as 
possible on behalf of the persons to whom one is giving life with their health, 
character and cognitive capacities. 
 In his 2004 paper “If you must make babies, then at least make the best 
babies you can?” Matti Häyry (2004)1 defends three claims: (1) that to have 
children is not necessarily good or rational; (2) that it would be good and ra-
tional to make sure that the children we do have have the best possible lives; 
(3) that it is not easy to judge whether scientific advances (e.g. the possibility 
of embryo selection by IVF) or social changes are the best means to achieve 
this outcome. On the basis of a harmed-condition account of disability, I shall 
challenge the assumption, implicit in (3), that conferring benefits by enhance-
ments and by social change are mutually exclusive. Then I shall argue in favor 
of (2) and dismiss some common objections to cognitive enhancements 
(safety, allocation of resources and diminished agency). I shall also discuss the 
view according to which the adoption of enhancing strategies in reproduction 
and parenting is an instance of a general tendency towards the commodifica-
tion of children. In working out what commodification entails, I shall argue in 
favor of (1), but from a different perspective from Häyry’s. I shall claim that 
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the motivation people have to reproduce might be more or less morally accept-
able, but once the decision to reproduce is made, no further harm can come 
from enhancing the (future) child’s capacities. 
 
2. Moral Reasons for Enhancing 
 
In this chapter I defend the view that we have moral reasons to enhance. The 
basis for my defense of enhancements is the principle of beneficence, accord-
ing to which people have a moral obligation to prevent harm and to confer 
benefits when it is possible. But the presence of moral reasons to enhance does 
not imply that people have any moral obligation to use any specific enhance-
ment strategy in conferring benefits to their (future) children. An “enhancing 
strategy” is any activity that aims at preventing harm and conferring benefit. 
On this account, organizing music instruction for one’s children when they are 
aged 3-9 is an enhancing strategy, if it is true that there is a correlation be-
tween music instruction in young children and increased spatio-temporal and 
mathematical abilities.2
There is a gulf between recognizing moral reasons to enhance and argu-
ing that we should be morally obliged to adopt one specific enhancing strategy 
in reproduction or parenting. And that is why the debate on enhancements can-
not be exhausted by an appeal to beneficence and the harm-benefit continuum. 
There are pressing questions that must be raised and answered. How powerful 
are the moral reasons we have for enhancing? Are there any moral reasons 
against enhancing as such? What are the risks and costs involved in enhanc-
ing? Are there any moral reasons against any specific enhancing strategies? 
For instance, Häyry3 discusses one objection to embryo selection in assisted 
reproduction as enhancing strategy. The process necessary for assisted repro-
duction might place an unnecessary burden on women, who would be required 
to go through extensive testing and potentially distressful or painful proce-
dures. All these considerations must be taken into account in our decision-
making and only those measures that seem to have reasonable costs should be 
adopted in order to enhance.  
 
A. Disability 
 
In the so-called harmed condition account of disability, conditions are re-
garded as disabling if they are physical or mental conditions that are harmful to 
the individual. According to this account, disabling conditions constitute a dis-
advantage with respect to relevant alternatives, not necessarily with respect to 
the conditions of the typical human. The reason why the notion of normal spe-
cies functioning is unhelpful in defining disabilities is that it would make dis-
ability too narrow. Changing environmental factors, or new discoveries about 
the onset of serious diseases, for instance, might make it the case that typical 
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conditions of our species come to be regarded as disabling. Attention-deficit 
disorders, memory loss and Down’s syndrome are disabling, because, to dif-
ferent extent, they cause harm to the people who are in them by exposing them 
to risks, impairing them in what they do, limiting their opportunities or pre-
venting them from having experiences that are worthwhile.4  
This conception of disability is sufficiently broad to cover all the harmful 
conditions that we might intuitively regard as disabling, whether the harm be 
primarily caused by medical conditions of the person, cognitive, genetic or 
environmental factors or social context. Moreover, it has clear advantages with 
respect to a merely social conception of disability, as it is not committed to the 
rather implausible claim that all disabling features of the condition would dis-
appear if society were inclusive and free from discrimination or prejudice. 
Whereas it is certainly true that certain attitudes in society towards people who 
are perceived as different cannot but make things worse for disabled people, in 
many cases, perhaps most cases, their condition would remain harmful once 
society had been reformed (think again about attention-deficit disorders, mem-
ory loss or Down’s syndrome).  
What do I mean by “harm” in this context? I would like to adopt a very 
broad conception of harm as the set-back of interests or preferences about 
states of affairs that significantly affect an individual’s well-being. It could 
harm me not to be able to appreciate a spectacular sunset on the coast, because 
I would have an interest in enjoying that view. It would increase the quality 
and richness of my experiential life. It would have harmed me to be born in 
1774 rather than in 1974, because I would have had limited capacity to exer-
cise my autonomy in a society in which women were less likely to receive an 
education, participate in public life and make their own choices.  
The adoption of the harmed-condition account of disability has important 
consequences for our way of conceiving reproductive and parental choices. 
Once we accept that disabling conditions are harmful to the individual (by 
definition), it is easy to see that we have moral reasons to prevent disabling 
conditions if possible or reduce their harmful effects, as part of our commit-
ment to the basic moral principle of avoiding unnecessary harm. But, again, 
this says nothing about the way in which these moral reasons might impact in 
practice on our choices. One might recognize the presence of moral reasons to 
prevent disabling conditions or reduce their harmful effects and still object on 
moral or other grounds to the methods by which the obligation can be carried 
out given a rational costs/benefits analysis. Moreover, the strength of the moral 
reasons we have to prevent disabilities might be thought to vary in accordance 
with the context of the disabling condition, and in accordance with the degree 
of harm that the disabling condition is likely to cause to (future) children. 
Many feel that we have a moral obligation to prevent a serious disability, but 
do not feel the same about a minor disability, which is going to cause just a 
slight inconvenience.  
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B. The Continuum between Harms and Benefits 
 
If we accept that there are moral reasons to prevent or eradicate disability 
when possible, does this commit us to recognize that we also have moral rea-
sons to enhance? Many have the intuition that there are moral reasons to avoid 
harm by preventing our children from being in disabling conditions, but view 
enhancements with suspicion. This intuition is an illusion for whoever is 
committed to the existence of the harm-benefit continuum. The harm-benefit 
continuum is the idea that “the reasons we have not to harm others or creating 
others who will be unnecessarily harmed are continuous with the reasons we 
have for conferring benefits on others if we can.”5 We seem to have moral 
reasons to improve the conditions in which others find themselves, whether 
these conditions are disabling or not. The reasons we have to avoid harming 
others are continuous with the reasons we have for conferring benefits on oth-
ers if we can, because all actions are re-describable as omissions and vice 
versa.6  
This is supported by the intuitive analogy between disability and en-
hancement. If disabling conditions constitute a disadvantage with respect to 
some relevant alternatives, enhanced conditions constitute an advantage. Let 
me offer an example. Research suggests that patients who suffer from sleep 
deprivation are at risk of developing cognitive and emotional difficulties, are 
slower at solving math’s problems and processing language and are much 
more prone to accidents when driving. Some amphetamines are used to coun-
terbalance the effects of sleep deprivation and they do so by improving atten-
tion, concentration, spatial working memory, and planning and have been long 
used by the US military for these purposes.7 Drugs that are safer and non-
addictive can have similar effects and could be used not to counteract the ef-
fects of a disabling condition but to improve performance, e.g. to help students 
perform well during examinations. It might seem uncontroversial to grant that 
an improved cognitive performance would constitute an advantage on the as-
sumption that the enhancing drugs are safe, but some maintain that there are 
moral objections to using drugs for this purpose. Some are concerned that there 
is less worth in achieving an objective such as passing an examination if one 
relies on the effects of chemical substances on one’s brain, or that unfairly dis-
tributed advantages will deeply affect an already unjust society. I am going to 
discuss these interesting objections to enhancements in the next section. 
 
C. Changing Society 
 
But before let me go back for a second to the moral justification of enhance-
ments in reproduction and parenting. Some might feel that, although there are 
moral reasons to confer benefits, adopting enhancing strategies to do so is not 
the best available course of action, as it precludes other, less controversial, 
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ways of doing it. For instance, Häyry8 presents the promotion of social 
changes as an alternative to enhancement if one wants to improve the life of 
one’s (future) children. But I cannot see how changing society and improving 
conditions in an individual would ever be mutually exclusive or even compet-
ing courses of action. If I have a child who is cognitively impaired, I might 
want to act on the surrounding social environment with the hope that, as a con-
sequence, he will be better accepted by his peers and that he will receive more 
support from his teachers, but my commitment to changing society for the bet-
ter is not incompatible with reducing the harm that the disability is causing to 
my child by intervening on his disabling condition. Similarly, in the case of a 
prenatal test revealing that my future child will have such a disability, I might 
want to take measures to prevent or reduce its potential effects on him and at 
the same time strengthen my commitment to creating a fairer world around 
him. In the circumstances in which the disability is so serious that parents 
come to believe that their future child will not have a life worth living, they 
might decide to terminate the pregnancy. But even in these extreme circum-
stances, it is not clear to me that they are confronted with a choice between 
changing society or changing the individual, or that they are sending any nega-
tive messages to other parents in similar circumstances who have taken a dif-
ferent course of action.  
 
3. Moral Reasons Not to Enhance 
 
A. Safety 
 
In the bioethical literature, the press, and even in recent cinematography, en-
hancements are viewed with great suspicion. First, there are concerns about the 
safety of the procedures involved. Second, there are worries about the limited 
amount of knowledge even experts have about the consequences of, say, ge-
netic engineering in cognitive domains. In Daniels (2005) we find an interest-
ing example.9 Suppose that we learn that an enhancement of short-term mem-
ory would benefit many of our cognitive processes and that we have the oppor-
tunity to enhance short-term memory by operating on embryos. Daniels argues 
that we should not do it because we would not be able to predict the conse-
quences of enhancing memory performance. Daniels’ concern is that en-
hancements might not really improve the quality of life. He is not just reiterat-
ing the idea that there are always risks involved in changing something that is 
working well enough. He is saying that, given the nature of certain modifica-
tions and the complex way in which we would need to assess their conse-
quences, the fact that the capacity or trait to be enhanced is a necessary condi-
tion for better performance does not mean that by enhancing it we would pro-
duce an overall better offspring. Another example of this phenomenon is the 
study that has been conducted at the University of Pennsylvania on mice. Mice 
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which had been genetically engineered to improve their memory and learning 
were then shown to be unusually sensitive to pain.10  
Safety concerns should definitely be taken into account, and it is reason-
able to assume that a careful risk/benefit analysis would not recommend many 
procedures that aim at enhancing complex cognitive functions at this stage. 
This fact, though, does not seem relevant to deeming enhancements per se un-
ethical. What would be unethical is to risk people’s health by enhancing their 
cognitive performance if the foreseen benefit is not worth the risk. Of course, 
separate issues are whether we can obtain non-biased information about safety, 
how the risk/benefit ratio should be calculated and by whom. It is a platitude 
that the perception of risk might vary and that some people might value the 
achievements made possible by enhanced conditions more than others. It is 
reported that many athletes would take a drug that would enable them to win 
every competition for a few years, even if the drug shortened their life signifi-
cantly.11
 
B. Limited Resources 
 
Safety aside, some people are worried about unfair allocation of resources. It is 
a common thought that some enhancing strategies such as genetic engineering 
are going to be very expensive and that only the better-off in society will be 
able to afford them. As a consequence, the current divisions in society will 
become even less bridgeable. Notice that this is not an ethical objection to en-
hancing as such, but a concern about the unfair distribution of resources. Actu-
ally, the worry about the ways in which enhancements will be distributed im-
plies that enhancements are perceived as a good thing. The problem of re-
source allocation is an extremely urgent one, but it is not specific to cognitive 
enhancement in any interesting way. For all the available resources which can 
be seen as beneficial to humans (e.g. food, education, therapies etc.), there is 
an unfair distribution in society. If cognitive enhancements are going to be a 
further available resource, the problem of access would apply to them too. 
Mehlman suggests a way in which some fair access could be promoted: 
 
A better approach would be to permit cognitive enhancements to be 
available on the open market for those who can afford them and to subsi-
dize access to them for those who cannot. … By making these products 
widely available, society would gain the benefits of achievements they 
made possible and reduce or at least refrain from exacerbating the ine-
qualities that stemmed from differences in wealth.12
 
Policy regulations and issues of state intervention in the research on cognitive 
enhancement and the availability of enhancing strategies will have to be 
thought out by paying attention to short- and long-term consequences, but 
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these measures would not and do not amount to an objection to enhancing on 
the basis that enhancing is unethical. 
  
C. Diminished Agency 
 
Finally, some believe that the practice of enhancing and genetically engineer-
ing capacities will lead to a revision of our conception of agency.13 Agents 
typically enjoy a certain amount of freedom of action and are subject to judg-
ments of praise for their achievements and of blame for their failures. But if 
the physical or intellectual achievement of the agent is only marginally due to 
effort and discipline and mainly due to the effects of, say, a powerful drug, the 
achievement might no longer be a good reason to admire the agent. The argu-
ment is supposed to show that a pervasive use of enhancement might lead to a 
diminished sense of agency and responsibility. 
To assess the force of this argument one needs to be able to account for 
what the consequences of the practice of enhancement would really be for our 
conception of agency. Partly, this is an empirical question. We know what our 
current psychological reactions to illicit drug-taking by athletes are; we feel it 
is cheating. But the scenario in which everybody is given an opportunity to 
enhance some of their conditions safely is significantly different and our reac-
tions would almost certainly reflect that difference. It is not at all obvious that 
we would lose the sense of ownership of our own actions if the capacities that 
made it possible for us to achieve something desirable had been enhanced. One 
possible consequence of pervasive enhancement could be a “raising the bar” 
effect that would subtract little to the merits of the personal achievements of 
the individual. 
That said, it seems as if the diminished agency objection is on to some-
thing. Suppose you are a runner and want to increase your speed by 20%. Also 
suppose that there are two methods by which you can achieve this target. You 
can take a pill that has an immediate enhancing effect on your speed or you 
can train for two months, three hours a day. Notice that these are both enhanc-
ing strategies if we define enhancements on the basis of their predicted out-
comes. Now, you might have a morally relevant reason to prefer the hard way 
to the easy way. You might value self-discipline and think that you will grow 
as a person if you achieve this target by making a conscious effort to perfect 
your body during the next two months. You might believe that the sense of 
satisfaction you would get at the end of the training for having achieved the 
target is worth the time and the effort that are required. But all these considera-
tions do not amount to judging that it would be unethical for you to choose the 
easy option.  
An analogous case can present itself when we are considering the ethics 
of enhancing cognitive capacities or cognitive performance in the context of 
reproductive choices. To give a child the opportunity to learn how to play a 
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musical instrument might be regarded as important, because receiving music 
instruction is a valuable experience independently of its alleged effects on 
memory and mathematical skills. It is valuable because it is formative, it is 
social and it might install certain values in the child, such as the idea that hard 
work pays off and that almost nothing rewarding in life comes cheap. If there 
was a magic pill that could produce the same enhancing effects immediately, 
would it be unethical to administer it to a child? The enhancing pill is not 
equivalent to music instruction, because taking the pill is not a formative ex-
perience, but it would not be unethical either. Moreover, some children do not 
get any pleasure out of studying music and would not respond positively to 
music instruction. For them, one could argue, taking the pill would not be a 
worse option. Their cognitive capacities would be enhanced to the same extent 
by hypothesis, and they would always have the opportunity to get the other 
benefits associated with music instruction from other formative and social ex-
periences in their lives.  
 
4. Commodification of Children 
 
Häyry (2004) reviews the reasons why people make a conscious decision to 
have babies in spite of the obvious fact that the future persons they generate 
might suffer in the course of their lives. The assessment of the reasons for re-
producing is not the main concern of this paper, but I need to address another 
common ethical objection to enhancing in reproduction, the so-called com-
modification of children, and the rationality of reproduction and commodifica-
tion are importantly related issues. One of the most popular objections to en-
hancing one’s children’s cognitive capacities is that it encourages parents to 
conceive of their children as commodities, as objects that have a value not in 
themselves but as means to achieve something else. Why do people want 
trendier clothes, cars or mobile phones? Because their aesthetic properties re-
flect on the image of the person who owns them. One might argue that to want 
a smarter child is an instance of the same kind of behavior. Parents, actual or 
prospective, might regard their children as a means to achieve status, as some-
thing to boast about, and not as persons whose life is valuable in itself.  
My view is that, once one makes the important decision to have children, 
there are moral reasons to do whatever is in one’s power to make sure that 
one’s children will have a happy life. This might include enhancing their cog-
nitive abilities by methods that one finds acceptable given their risks and costs. 
Obviously, there are many things one cannot have control over and one can 
never have any certainty that one’s children will be happy people. This is pre-
sumably why Häyry concludes that it is irrational to reproduce. But to claim 
that there are moral reasons to enhance is not sufficient to dismiss the com-
modification objection. The way in which parents conceive of their children 
has moral relevance and should be discussed, but not just in relation to en-
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hancement. The commodification of children as an objection to enhancing in 
reproduction is misplaced, as it should be viewed as an objection to reproduc-
tion tout court.  
It is often thought that people should not have merely “selfish” reasons to 
reproduce. The way they conceive of their children might be an indicator of 
poor parenting skills and might affect their capacity to bring about their chil-
dren’s happiness as well as their own. (This is an empirical claim and as such 
needs to be supported by evidence, but it has some initial plausibility.) We 
experience uneasiness when we read interviews to successful career women in 
their late thirties or early forties who declare that the only thing missing in 
their lives is a child, as if reproducing were the answer to a need for variety of 
experiences in one’s life or another target to tick off on an imaginary list of 
things to achieve by a certain age. Our uneasiness does not necessarily track 
the presence of wrongdoing. After all, people might have equally respectable 
and yet different reasons to make the choice of having children and personal 
realization is likely to play a role in almost all the life-changing decisions we 
make. However, my point is that, if there is a commodification of children ob-
jection to reproduction, it is certainly not confined to the practice of enhance-
ment. Commodification seems to be a complex phenomenon whose origin can 
be found in the motivations people have to reproduce and whose manifesta-
tions can vary. Refraining from enhancing would not necessarily contribute to 
changing such a conception of children. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that people have moral reasons to enhance the 
cognitive performance of their children on the basis of the principle of benefi-
cence and subject to an evaluation of the risks and costs of the chosen enhanc-
ing strategies. To further support my argument, I have defended three claims: 
(1) the practice of enhancement does not rule out the attempt to better one’s 
children’s life by changing society and in particular by eliminating prejudice 
against diversity; (2) the objections to enhancement that concern safety, alloca-
tion of resources and diminished agency do not seem to offer moral reasons 
against enhancements per se; (3) the common thought that enhancing might 
promote a view of children as commodities seems confused. The commodifi-
cation of children is a social phenomenon of which enhancement can be a 
manifestation, but which has its roots in the morally dubious reasons people 
might have to reproduce and which can manifest itself in numerous other 
ways. 
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